Decentralized supply chains coordination under uncertain competitiveness by Hjaila, Kefah et al.
Proceedings of the 6th Manufacturing Engineering Society International Conference – Barcelona – July 2015 
 
Decentralized Supply Chains Coordination under 
Uncertain Competitiveness  
 
K. Hjaila, L. Puigjaner, A. Espuña 
 
 Chemical Engineering Department, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, ETSEIB. Av. Diagonal 
647, 08028 Barcelona, Spain.  
Kefah.hjaila@upc.edu 
 
ABSTRACT 
The coordination of decentralized multi-site multi-product manufacturing SCs is 
achieved through Scenario-Based Negotiations (SBNs) based on expected win-
win principles in an uncertain competitive environment. Based on the non-
symmetric roles of the different actors, the client (SC leader) is supposed to 
propose coordination contracts according to its best expected conditions, taking 
into account the uncertain reaction of the provider (follower). This uncertain 
reaction is modeled as a probability of acceptance, computed according to the 
overall scenario conditions, which include the presence of third parties. Different 
negotiation scenarios are analyzed considering i) Standalone, ii) Cooperative, 
and iii) Non-Cooperative cases. The resulting MINLP tactical models are 
illustrated using a case study with different providers (follower SCs) around a 
client (SC leader) interacting in a global decentralized scenario. The Non-
Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (nCNS) proves to identify the situation with, 
higher independent profit expectations, while cooperation would lead to higher 
overall profit. Moreover, the proposed approach shows the importance of 
considering the uncertainty associated with the response of the followers to the 
leader's decision-making, resulting from a wider knowledge of its options. 
Keywords: Manufacturing Planning, Decentralized Supply Chains, Coordination, 
Negotiation, Uncertainty. 
  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The competitiveness between the manufacturing industries shifts the focusing of decision-makers 
towards the coordination of their Supply Chains (SCs), based on individual and global objectives. Many 
works have been carried out on the internal coordination between the different echelons of a SC through 
the supply/demand flow coherence at the tactical level [1, 2]. But these works focus on the global 
objective of the system from a centralized perspective, disregarding the individual goals, which are crucial 
when dealing with complex decentralized SCs superstructures, especially when different stakeholders 
with conflicting objectives are involved; each stakeholder seeking to optimize its own benefits no matter 
how the other participating stakeholders’ uncertain reactions will be.  
Many works have been carried out to solve these complexities such as [3], who propose a “revenue 
sharing” negotiation approach for one manufacturer-different competing retailers SC. However, in their 
work, the manufacturer provides the initial production plan based on its own uncertain conditions, 
disregarding the uncertain behavior of the retailers SCs, which may lead to SC disruptions. Another 
negotiation method has been developed by [4] for a manufacturer-retailer SC, based on bi-directional 
option contracts (call option or put option); for the call option, the manufacturer can buy a specific 
amount of products at a specific price, while for the put option, the retailer must pay an allowance for 
cancelling or returning an order. Multi-agent systems also have been proposed as a negotiation strategy, 
such as the work of [5], who develop a multi-agent auction-protocol tactical model for the optimization of 
a Brazilian oil SC in order to identify the oil products transport plan. However, the multi-agent-based 
negotiations are built on cooperative SCs, in which all participating agents cooperate with one common 
objective function, disregarding the individual objectives and their uncertain nature, which may affect the 
performance of the whole system. From the other hand, different Game Theory strategies have been 
proposed by [6] for the optimization of decentralized SCs at the design and tactical levels for multi-
echelon SCs network; they solve the competitiveness among the suppliers/retailers based on cooperative 
games through Nash Equilibrium, while the interactions between the manufacturer and the 
suppliers/retailers are modeled as non-cooperative Stackelberg games. However, in their cooperative 
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games, the competitive suppliers have to sell to the manufacturer (client), giving the client a dominant 
leadership, disregarding the uncertain reaction of the follower SCs (suppliers/retailers), which may lead 
to disruptions that may affect the global SC structure.  
Notwithstanding, current negotiation methods for decentralized manufacturing SCs coordination allow to 
provide individual decisions based on static cases, without knowing the whole SC picture and how the 
other partners react, leading to incomplete negotiations, particularly, when negotiation partners are 
subjected to risk, which may lead to lose partners from the global SC network. So, effective negotiations 
that able to incorporate the conflicting objectives of all participants, in the tactical models, are necessary 
to avoid any possible SCs disruptions due to quick decisions.  
Accordingly, this work proposes a novel scenario-based negotiation (SBN) approach as a decision-support 
tool to set the best conditions for the coordination contract between independent manufacturing SCs with 
conflicting objectives within a multi-site multi-product decentralized SC superstructure. The proposed 
SBN approach extends the limits of the SC of interest to consider both clients and providers, with their 
respective manufacturing SCs, as part of the global system, in order to improve the decentralized SCs 
tactical decision-making through cooperative and no-cooperative negotiations built on expected win-to-
win principles.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
Within a decentralized SC superstructure, the negotiating partners are the client and the provider, and the 
negotiation item is the internal product flow (physical/economic) between their manufacturing SCs. 
Based on complete information for “dynamic” negotiations, both negotiating partners decide to 
communicate their information, actions, and responses. The reaction function is identified as the quantity 
and the price of the item subject to negotiation at each time edge along a discrete planning time horizon. 
Assuming non-symmetric roles, and under the leading role of the client, the leader designs a set of 
coordination contracts (Figure 1) based on its best conditions, taking into account the risk associated with 
the follower SC external conditions, represented by the probability of acceptance, in order to drive the 
negotiations towards expected win-win outcomes. To respond flexibly, the follower analyzes the leader 
contract offers based on its manufacturing SC risk scenarios projected on its probability curves.   
 
Figure 1. SBN methodology 
The SBN methodology is divided into two main parts: 1) analyzing the negotiation scenarios, and 2) 
preparing the final coordination agreement.  
2.1 Negotiation scenarios 
i) Standalone Scenario (SS): the negotiating partners optimize their individual benefits independently, 
without considering the negotiation item, to be used as benchmarks for all negotiation methods.  
ii) Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (CNS): the negotiating partners form a coalition towards maximizing 
the global SC profit.  
iii) Non-Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (nCNS): the negotiating partners, independently, optimize their 
SCs benefits, taking into consideration the negotiation item along the planning time horizon.   
2.2 Preparing the final coordination agreement 
From the leader's side: 
The benefits of any reduction in the uncertainty associated with the signature of the collaboration 
agreement are considered, which is modeled as the probability of acceptance of this agreement by the 
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follower SC. To calculate the probability of acceptance, a set of external risk scenarios (follower SC) is 
generated using Monte-Carlo method. The leader then uses these values for calculating its SC expected 
benefits. Therefore, the proposed contract by the leader will be the one that leads to its highest expected 
benefit 
From the follower's side: 
Based on the proposed leader contract, the follower assesses the risk associated with accepting or 
rejecting this offer based on its SC expected benefits probability curves (considering the external risk 
scenarios). If the expected profits resulting from accepting the offer have higher probabilities, then it 
would be preferable for the follower to accept the offer.  
 
3. Mathematical Model 
3.1 The tactical basis model 
A tactical MINLP generic model has been developed to be used as a basis for the negotiation scenarios. 
Therefore, it will be spread or modified according with each scenario. To represent the negotiation 
strategy, a set of supply chains (sc1, sc2…, SC) is considered with their subsets linking each SC to its 
corresponding negotiation partner (follower F or leader L). Moreover, the model includes a set of 
resources r, external suppliers s, production plants pl, warehouses w, and external markets m.  
The total sales 
scSALE (Eq. 1) include the sales to the leader (L) plus the sales to the external markets 
(M); where ', 'r scp and , ,r m trp are the internal product and the final product prices, respectively. 
, , , , , , , ,sc r sc m r sc m t r sc F r sc F t
r R m M t T r R t T
SALE rp RS p RS    
    
    
                                          
       sc SC    (1) 
The SC Cost along the discrete planning time horizon T is the summation of the external resources 
purchase, production, storage, transport, and the negotiation item total costs, respectively (Eq. 2). Here 
can be understood the conflictive objectives between the leader and the follower, as the value of the 
negotiation item is considered as sale when the SC belongs to the follower (Eq. 1) and as cost when the SC 
belongs to the leader (Eq. 2).  
, , ,sc sc sc sc sc r sc L r sc L t
t T r R
COST CRM CPR CST CTR p RS    
 
     
 
       sc SC    (2) 
The objective function corresponds to the maximization of the SC profit (Eq. 3). 
3.2 Application of negotiation scenarios 
i) Standalone scenario (SS): the negotiation resource amounts
', ',r sc tRS in the basis model will be set to 
zero. 
ii) Cooperative negotiation scenario (CNS): the global SC profit (Tprofit) (Eq. 4). 
sc
sc SC
Tprofit PROF

    (4) 
iii) Non-cooperative negotiation scenario (nCNS): the negotiation resource quantity ', ',r sc tRS  in the basis 
model will be substituted by a constant value 
', ',r sc tLRS  resulted from optimizing the leader SC 
benefits. 
3.3 Uncertainty reduction cost: 
The uncertainty reduction cost can be represented within the expected leader SC profit (
'scExPROF ) as 
an “abridged” uncertainty risk (Eq. 5). 
 ' sc Fsc L sc LE uncertaintyxPROF P F kO sR ri                                                                       sc SC   (5) 
sc sc scPROF SALE COST    
sc SC     (3) 
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The uncertainty risk is represented by the probability of acceptance, 'scprob (Eq. 6). 
.     
 .  
sc
sc
sc
No of scenarios of improved profits
Total No of scenario
prob
s



                                           sc F                              (6) 
4. Case study 
The developed MINLP models have been implemented and solved for a real data case study modified from 
the centralized SC of (Hjaila et al., 2014) (Figure 2). The negotiating partners are the polystyrene 
manufacturing SC stakeholder (as leader) and the energy generation SC stakeholder (as follower). The 
internal energy provided/demanded will be the item to be negotiated (amounts and price). The internal 
energy price offered by the leader varies between 0.14€/kWh to 0.22€/kWh.  
 
Figure 2. Decentralized SC superstructure 
The case study is modelled using the General Algebraic Modeling System GAMS 24.2.3 on a Windows 7 
computer  with Intel® Core™ i7-2600 CPU 3.40GHz processor with 16.0 GB of RAM, and the resulting 
tactical MINLP models have been solved for 6 time periods of 1000 working hours each, using Global 
mixed-integer quadratic optimizer “GloMIQO (7)”. The tactical decisions achieved are the expected RM 
acquisition, internal product and price, production, inventory, and distribution levels. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Negotiation Scenarios 
Considering a deterministic situation based on fixed market energy prices (0.20 €/kWh for energy selling 
to external markets, 0.19-0.21 €/kWh for energy selling to the local Grid, 0.22 €/kWh for energy buying 
from the local Grid to the external energy markets, and 0.20-0.22 €/kWh for energy buying from the local 
Grid to the leader SC.), the total and individual SCs Profits resulting from the different leader contract 
offers are obtained for the negotiation scenarios (Figures 3 and 4). The purple line represents the SC 
profits ensuing from the leader SC (Figure 3) and the Follower SC (Figure 4) standalone scenarios (SS), so 
the negotiation only has sense when the profits exceed this line. From the leader side (Figure 3), it seems 
that the nCNS leads to better solutions than the CNS at all negotiation prices offers, although the CNS leads 
to higher overall profits.  
 
Figure 3. Leader SC nominal profit vs negotiation price 
From the follower side, it is noticed that for negotiation prices above 0.18 €/kWh, the CNS would lead to 
better profits, if the risks associated with its SC uncertain external conditions are not considered. 
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Figure 4. Follower SC nominal profit vs negotiation price 
As a first step, and since the nCNS proves to be the most adequate negotiation approach from the leader 
side, it will be considered for preparing the final contract agreement. Furthermore, the model statistics 
show that the nCNS mathematical formulation is less complex as it allows to identify better solutions in 
less computational efforts; 32% less than SS and 63% less than CNS and SS scenarios, respectively. 
 
4.2 Coordination Agreement 
So, in order to drive the negotiations towards expected win-to-win outcomes, the uncertain reaction of the 
follower resulted from its uncertain external conditions will be represented as probability of acceptance 
in the objective function of the leader SC model. 
From the leader side: 
Figure 5 illustrates the leader expected profits vs. the follower’s probability of acceptance (eqs. 5 and 6), 
compared with the leader nominal profits (at the deterministic situation based on fixed markets energy 
prices). It is expected that the probability of acceptance increases as the contract price increases; but at 
contract price 0.22 €/kWh, the leader decides to buy higher amounts of energy from the local Grid, 
resulting in a sudden probability of acceptance reduction. It is to be noticed that the highest expected 
leader SC profit is at contract price (0.15 €/kWh); 12 % less than its nominal profit at the same price. The 
total energy amount needed for the Polystyrene manufacturing during the established long term planning 
horizon is (24.71GWh); 36% of this amount is expected to be provided by the follower SC (8.94 GWh), 
while the rest is to be covered by the local Grid. It is worth mentioning that before considering the 
uncertain reaction of the follower, the contract price 0.14€/kWh was the best option for the leader, but 
after considering the uncertain reaction of the follower, the leader offers higher price, resulting in the final 
contract agreement (8.94 GWh at 0.15€/kWh). 
 
Figure 5. Leader nominal and expected Profits vs. Probability of acceptance  
From the follower side: 
The follower now assesses this final offer in order to respond (accept or reject), based on its SC expected 
benefits probabilities (Figure 6), as follows: 
 To accept: expected energy SC profit (nCNS) = 2.46 M€. 
 To reject: the follower SC Profit at the nominal expected SS are obtained based on the external risk 
scenarios, and the probability curves are obtained for both accepting and rejecting (Figure 6).  
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However, the expected profit resulting from accepting the contract seems to have higher probabilities 
(Figure 6), in which the follower should accept in order to avoid any disruptions resulting from the 
uncertain behavior of its SC external markets. 
 
Figure 6. Probability distribution and cumulative probability curves   
4.3 Tactical and economic decisions 
Figure 7 summarizes the leader energy demands according with the negotiation scenarios (CNS, nCNS, 
and SS). It can be noticed that the total energy demanded for the leader manufacturing processes is the 
same (24.71 GWh) for the nCNS and the SS, as the option is to fulfill the polystyrene final markets 
demands. However, the energy demanded for the leader manufacturing processes (24.68 GWh) is 0.1% 
less in the case of CNS, which means quantitatively a difference of 21.86 MWh. In fact, this meanss that the 
decision to be taken is to do not fulfill the final polystyrene markets demands, since it only represents 0.1 
% reduction in the economic sales (17.11 k€)(Figure 8). 
                                       
Figure 7. Leader expected energy demands  
Figure 8 shows the expected economic decisions of the leader manufacturing SC (CNS, nCNS, and SS). The 
nCNS results in 0.4 % and 36.4% savings in the expected energy purchase cost from the local Grid, 
compared with the CNS and SS cases, respectively. Furthermore, the nCNS results in 2 % savings in the RM 
purchase cost, compared with the CNS. The inventory economic decisions record 40.5 % and 31.5 % 
savings, compared with the CNS and SS, respectively, and the distribution cost results in 3.3 % savings, 
compared with the SS.  It is worth mentioning that the total RM purchase cost using the CNS is 2 % higher 
than using the nCNS, because, unlike the nCNS, the CNS does not give enough freedom to the leader to 
choose the cheapest RM options and prices.  
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Figure 8. Leader expected economic decisions breakdown 
Table 1 summarizes the economic assessment of the leader economic decisions resulted from the CNS, 
nCNS, and the SS decisions. The final coordination contract is expected to improve the total profit of the 
leader manufacturing SC with 1 % (74.45 k€) and 8 % (569.08 k€) along the considered planning time 
horizon, compared with the expected nominal profit resulted from the CNS and SS, respectively.  
Table 1. Leader economic decisions- summary 
  CNS nCNS SS 
Cost (M€) 10.61 10.55 11.12 
Sales (M€) 18.58 18.59 18.59 
Profit (M€) 7.96 8.04 7.47 
 
4.4 Follower economic decisions 
Table 2 summarizes the follower nominal expected economic decisions, based on its SC external expected 
risk scenarios built upon the final contract 8.94 GWh at 0.15€/kWh. A total of 500 expected risk scenarios 
were generated using Monte-Carlo method, assuming equal probabilities. The nCNS results in 2.46 M€ 
expected nominal SC Profit, which means 10.8 % improvement, over the planning time horizon. The 
follower profit at the nominal expected SS (2.74 M€) is 10.3 % higher than the expected SC Profit using 
the nCNS. However, as we mentioned before, the nominal expected profits resulting from the nCNS have 
higher probabilities than of the SS (Figure 6). 
Table 2. Follower expected nominal economic decisions- summary 
  CNS nCNS SS 
Cost (M€) 14.69 14.11 13.20 
Sales (M€) 16.91 16.57 15.94 
Profit (M€) 2.22 2.46 2.74 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The coordination of independent multi-echelon multi-site multi-product manufacturing SCs is achieved. 
The interaction between stockholders' conflictive objectives is captured through non-zero-sum Scenario-
Based Negotiations (SBN), built on expected win-to-win principles. Based on non-symmetric roles, the 
client “as leader” designs its moves taking into account the uncertain reaction of the provider “follower”, 
which is modelled as a probability of acceptance. Different negotiation scenarios are analyzed, based on 
individual and global objectives: i) Standalone Scenario (SS), ii) Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (CNS), 
and iii) Non-Cooperative Negotiation Scenario (nCNS), resulting in different flexible MINLP tactical 
models. A comparison between the different models is illustrated through a case study, which coordinates 
different providers’ production SCs around a manufacturing SC “leader”. The results show that the nCNS 
leads to higher expected benefits (8 % and 1 % comparing with SS and CNS scenarios, respectively). 
Unlike the CNS, the nCNS gives enough freedom to the stockholders to control their SC flows 
(physical/economic), allowing them to modify their relationships during the optimization procedure. 
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Furthermore, the negotiation scenarios affect the tactical decisions the leader has to make in order to 
absorb the risks associated with the follower SC, leading to expected decisions improvements. In any 
negotiation method, the follower should avoid any quick decisions based on the highest expected benefits 
without considering the probabilities associated with these benefits. The proposed approach incorporates 
in a practical decision-support tool good enough for covering all types of SCs negotiations 
(cooperative/non-cooperative), allowing to anticipate the mechanisms different manufacturers may use 
to modify their relationships with their clients and providers during the optimization procedure, which 
can be used for further second stage agreements. 
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Nomenclature  
Indexes  
r resource (raw material, internal/final product, energy, …) 
sc supply chain 
sc’ negotiation partners SCs 
t time period 
Sets  
L leader 
F follower 
SC supply chains 
S RM suppliers 
PL production plants  
w warehouses/distribution center 
M external markets (final consumers) 
R  resources (raw materials, products, energy,…) 
r’ negotiation resource 
T time periods 
Parameters  
, ,r sc mrp  unit cost value of resource r to the final market m  
Variables:  
, ,r sc tRS    negotiation resources r’ between the negotiating partners sc’ at time t 
, , ,r sc m tRS  resources r flows from sc to final markets m at time t 
, , ,r w sc tRS     
resources r’ flows from warehouses w to internal markets/leader sc’ at time t 
scPROF  
aggregated profit of supply chain sc 
Tprofit  aggregated profit of the whole system 
scSALE  
economic incomes (sales value) of supply chain sc 
scCOST  
cost of supply chain sc 
scCRM  
RM cost  
scCPR  
production cost 
scCST  
storage cost 
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scCTR  
Transport cost 
,r scp    
unit cost of the negotiation resource r’ for sc’ 
, ,r sc tLRS    Negotiation resource r’ amounts resulting from optimizing sc’ (leader) 
scExPROF   Expected sc’ (leader) aggregated profit 
scprob   probability of acceptance  
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